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Abstract. We study whether and how a country’s environmental, social, and governance (ESG) 
performance relates to its sovereign borrowing costs in international capital markets. We 
hypothesize that good ESG performance plays an economic role: It signals a country’s 
commitment to sustainability and long-term orientation and is a buffer against negative shocks, 
leading to lower sovereign bond yield spreads. Using a sample of 20 OECD countries over the 
period 1996-2012, we show that countries with good ESG performance are associated with lower 
default risk and lower sovereign bond yield spreads. Moreover, we show that the social and 
governance dimensions have a significant negative association with sovereign bond yield 
spreads, whereas the environmental dimension does not. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
We investigate the drivers of sovereign bond yield spreads and focus on the role of sustainable 
development with respect to macroeconomic and financial conditions. There are two different 
strands of literature explaining why sustainability and sovereign bond spreads are related. The 
first builds upon investor preferences and values, which documents that although the main 
motives for an investment decision are guided by returns and diversification, an increasing 
number of investors are interested in the environmental, social, and governance (hereafter ESG) 
performance of their portfolio (Bénabou and Tirole, 2010; Kitzmueller and Shimshack, 2012). 
The second is primarily interested in financial performance and considers if non-financial factors 
in the investment process can bring improved profitability as well as better risk management (e.g. 
Galema et al., 2008; Lins et al, 2017). Some financial firms assume that ESG factors improve 
asset management in fixed income markets (Calvert, 2015; Hoepner et al., 2016). Investors may 
use ESG performance as a signal for the risk of losses when they consider lending money. As 
such, governments with poor ESG performance are more risky. Then, investors would require a 
higher interest rate to fund their debt. The quality of institutions determines how a government 
manages its debt (Icaza, 2016). When analyzing the relationship between bonds and ESG, most 
studies focus on corporate bonds (Godfrey et al., 2009; Bauer and Hann, 2011; El Ghoul et al., 
2011; Hoepner et al., 2016). Few studies (Drut, 2010; Berg et al., 2016) investigate the 
relationship between ESG performance and sovereigns. This partly results from the lack of 
reliable data on ESG criteria and the absence of a clear methodology to assess ESG performance 
at a country level. 
 
The validity of ESG data is highly disputed (e.g., Chatterji et al., 2009; Scholtens, 2017). We 
address this data issue by constructing a performance index from 18 different ESG indicators from 
reliable non-commercial providers for 20 OECD countries. We introduce a novel methodology 
for aggregating these indicators into four indexes, namely an environmental quality index, a social 
development index, a governance quality index, and a composite index. We analyze how a 
country's ESG performance relates to sovereign risk by exploring the link between overall ESG 
performance and sovereign bond spreads, and we decompose the impact along individual ESG 
factors. In a sensitivity analysis, we compare the role of ESG in euro member states to that in 
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other OECD countries. In addition, we investigate whether the Global Financial Crisis altered the 
nature and/or strength of the ESG performance–sovereign risk nexus. 
 
Our results illustrate the complexity of the economic relationship between a country’s ESG 
performance and its sovereign risk. We find that ESG performance significantly and negatively 
relates to sovereign bond yield spreads. Both macroeconomic and ESG factors are priced by 
sovereign bond markets, with good ESG practices associated with less default risk and thus lower 
bond spreads. This implies that it is relevant to account for ESG performance when designing 
strategic asset allocation across countries. When considering the differentiated impact of the 
various ESG dimensions on sovereign bond yield spreads, we find that governance has a stronger 
impact than social performance, and that environmental performance appears to have no 
significant impact. Further, we establish that the relationship between sovereign risk and a 
country's ESG performance is stronger in euro member states than in other OECD countries. Last, 
is a stronger influence from ESG performance in the wake of the Global Financial Crisis. 
 
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 investigates the literature and 
develops our hypotheses. Section 3 describes the data and provides descriptive statistics. Section 4 
details our methodology. Section 5 describes the empirical results. Finally, Section 6 sets forth 
our conclusions. 
 
2. BACKGROUND 
 
Determinants of sovereign bond yields and spreads have been extensively investigated (Attinasi 
et al., 2009; Barbosa and Costa, 2010; Afonso et al., 2012; Poghosyan, 2012; D’Agostino and 
Ehrmann, 2013). In general, the literature concludes that sovereign bond spreads depend on 
fundamental conditions of the economy, most prominently in relation to government finances 
(Ardagna et al., 2007; Attinasi et al., 2009; Baldacci and Kumar, 2010; Beirne and Fratzscher, 
2012; Aizenman and Hutchinson, 2013; Ghosh et al., 2013). For example, when public deficits 
and debt increase, sovereign bond yields soar in recognition of the higher risk (such as 
monetization-driven depreciation and inflation) carried by investors holding these securities. 
However, the literature is inconclusive regarding the dominant drivers of sovereign yield spreads 
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and it seems that especially sovereign debt risks are underestimated (Dufrénot et al., 2016). Since 
the Global Financial Crisis (GFC), the relationship between sovereign bond spreads and 
macroeconomic fundamentals seems to have broken down. De Grauwe and Ji (2013) observe that 
the drop in spreads does not relate to changes in debt-to-GDP ratios. Poghosyan (2012) notes that 
despite the piling up of public debt in the US in the aftermath of the GFC, US bond yields have 
been trending downward. In contrast, despite a relatively low initial level of public debt, sovereign 
borrowing costs in some euro countries such as Spain have persistently exceeded those of more 
heavily indebted countries such as the UK. Thus, part of the spread is unexplained, and spreads 
seem to be higher than justified on fundamentals only (Di Cesare et al., 2012). 
 
These findings have prompted renewed interest in the drivers of sovereign bond spreads. An 
increasing number of papers have set out to explore the use of qualitative factors as potential 
determinants of sovereign bond spreads. These factors may capture the “soft” aspects of a 
country's ability to service its debt obligations. This especially relates to the willingness—as 
opposed to the ability—of a country to pay interest, the flexibility of an economy and its growth 
capacity, the transparency of information, as well as a country's fiscal credibility and commitment 
to responsible borrowing. In this respect, it is important to realize that sovereigns wish to maintain 
a solid reputation to ensure access to financial markets. A more long-term orientation of a country 
signals its commitment to maintaining a good reputation and is associated with a lower likelihood 
of defaulting on its debt obligations (Eaton and Gersovitz, 1981). Nelson (2013) and Papanikos 
(2014) argue that financial markets consider a variety of qualitative indicators (such as 
government reputation or political issues), not just debt levels, when evaluating the manageability 
of a country's debt. In this respect, sustainable exploitation of natural resources and building up 
social capital could also reflect a long-term orientation of a country. In case of default, this would 
not only affect a country’s opportunities to borrow money, it would also reduce the value of its 
environmental and social resources. In addition, these resources might act as a buffer against 
negative shocks. Thus, there is a clear case for focusing on ESG performance in relation to 
sovereign yields (Sachs, 2015). 
 
Few researchers investigate the relationship between ESG performance and sovereign bond 
spreads. Berg et al. (2016) argue that environmental and social information helps to assess the 
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expected value and volatility of sovereign bond spreads in emerging markets. However, these 
authors arrive at mixed findings as to how this information affects spreads and ratings. Scholtens 
(2017) argues that financial institutions should also account for ecological dimensions. He points 
to both positive and negative spillovers between financial and environmental performance. 
Accounting for these factors would inform financial institutions and their stakeholders about their 
societal and economic roles in a more efficient and effective manner. Gervich (2011) thinks 
environmental indicators may be an “early warning” system that can help predict a nation's 
financial collapse before it is predicted by conventional economic indicators. Further, sovereign 
bond spreads are sensitive to governance factors (i.e., the quality of legal institutions), as is evident 
when investigating country risk and ratings (Erb et al., 1996; Haque et al., 1998; Ciocchini et al., 
2003; Butler et al., 2009; Bundala, 2013). Therefore, we hypothesize that ESG performance of a 
country is of economic relevance too. That is, it signals a country’s long-term orientation and is a 
buffer against shocks. Countries with good ESG performance may have lower default risk and, 
hence, lower costs of debt. Thus, our first hypothesis is that countries with high ESG scores have 
lower bond yield spreads, and we test: 
 
H1: There is a negative relationship between a country's ESG performance and sovereign bond 
spreads. 
 
Chatterji et al. (2009) and Godfrey et al. (2009) argue that combining distinct features of 
sustainability to create “a single monolithic construct” dilutes the observable financial effects of 
unidimensional features. In particular, governance is frequently studied in connection with 
country risk (Erb et al., 1996; Haque et al., 1998; Ciocchini et al., 2003; Butler and Fauver, 2006; 
Afonso et al., 2007; Connolly, 2007). Therefore, we want to relate governance directly to 
sovereign bond spreads. We expect that if there is an impact, this shows up in the governance 
dimension of ESG. For equity markets, Edmans (2011) suggests a firm’s social performance can 
be advantageous for its financial performance. However, thus far, social factors have not been 
studied in the context of bond markets. We feel they deserve attention as potential drivers of bond 
spreads, since they make up the stock of human and social capital in a country and, as such, 
contribute to potential productivity. This too would imply a negative relationship between social 
performance and bond spreads. As there is no prior research on this issue, any hypothesis can be 
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only exploratory in nature. Regarding the environmental dimension, the risks that this factor poses 
to both firms and economic growth are well known, and the existing evidence supports the broader 
economic impact of climate change, pollution, loss of ecosystem services, large-scale 
environmental accidents, etc. (Grossman and Krueger, 1991; Heyes, 2000; Decker and Woher, 
2012; De Haan et al., 2012). This too would result in a hypothesis that holds that there is a negative 
relationship between environmental performance and bond spreads. As to the scarce empirical 
literature on bond markets, UNEP (2011) is unable to establish a significant correlation between 
a country’s ecological balance and its credit rating. Berg et al. (2016) find that environmental 
performance is sometimes positively associated with credit rating in emerging markets, but it 
shows a mixed relation with bond spreads. Although both social and environmental performance 
potentially influence economic performance, the relationship appears to be weak. This sets these 
factors apart from governance performance. Given the lack of theory and limited empirical 
evidence thus far, a hypothesis about how environmental performance relates to bond spreads will 
have an exploratory nature. Thus, we will test: 
 
H2: The components of corporate social responsibility have a differential impact on sovereign 
bond yields. 
 
3. DATA 
 
3.1 Country ESG performance: ESG index 
 
To construct the composite ESG index, we account for recommendations made in ESG analysis 
reports published by rating agencies and asset managers. These reports include VIGEO (2013), 
HSBC AM (2013), Natixis AM (2013), MSCI ESG Country Ratings (2013), and Neuberger 
Berman’s emerging market debt team (2014) (see Table A.1.1 in the Appendix). Despite their 
wide use, there are concerns about the validity and reliability of these ratings (Chatterji et al., 
2009). Most ESG ratings measure policy, and potentially merely symbolic activities, rather than 
actual reductions of environmental or social impacts and associated risks (Gonenc and Scholtens, 
2017). In addition, while capturing a broad scope of potentially relevant issues, it is often 
ambiguous what actually gets measured. ESG ratings are not verified, validated, or replicable with 
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the help of public information (Halbritter and Dorfleitner, 2015; Delmas et al., 2011). We aim to 
address some of these limitations and try to generate new insights as to whether, when, and which 
kind of ESG is value-relevant. To this extent, we do not rely on qualifications by ratings 
institutions, but select directly observable items. We feel this allows for a more coherent and 
transparent analysis. 
 
To measure a country's environmental performance, we use World Development Indicators 
(WDI) proposed by the World Bank Group, which contain information on air quality, water and 
sanitation, forests, and renewable energy. Countries that perform well in this regard do their best 
to maintain and improve the environment. They show long-term commitment, which may 
positively relate to their willingness to pay off their debt (Eaton and Gersovitz, 1981). We also 
use the WDI dataset to obtain information on education, demography, health, employment, and 
gender equality. Here, countries performing well show commitment to their stock of human and 
social capital, which is regarded as long-term commitment as well (Lins et al., 2017). The data on 
democratic institutions and safety policy are from Kaufmann et al. (2005). Their dataset presents 
estimates of six dimensions of governance: voice and accountability, political stability and 
absence of violence, country effectiveness, regulatory quality, rule of law, and control of 
corruption. These dimensions positively associate with economic performance (Kaufmann et al., 
2005; Butler and Fauver, 2006; Butler et al., 2009). Thus, in all, we have 18 items to assess ESG 
performance at the country level (six for each of the three dimensions; details are presented in 
Table A.1.2 of the Appendix). For the environmental and social items, we assume that better 
performance improves the quality of natural resources and the quality of social and human capital, 
respectively. For the six governance items, we assume that better performance in each reflects 
better quality of governance and institutions. The social and environmental variables especially 
relate to long-term commitment, whereas the governance variables are closer to the efficiency and 
effectiveness of economic processes. It might be that financial markets have more appreciation 
for the latter than the former because many market participants highly discount the future (Gollier, 
2013; Zingales, 2015). 
 
There is no generally accepted framework to relate the 18 items to sovereign yield spreads. 
Therefore, we construct an ESG index as a proxy and follow the method of Nicoletti et al. (2000), 
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which relies on principal component analysis (PCA). PCA differs from other standard methods, 
such as a ranking-of-ranking approach that initially ranks countries according to each of the basic 
indicators, and then averages the individual ranking positions to produce a final country ranking. 
PCA differs from a subjective weighting scheme based on expert assessment of the importance 
of the data comprising the ESG analysis found in the literature to weigh composite indexes. In 
particular, it considers not only the first principal component to weight the index, but also the 
factor loadings of the consecutively extracted components. The advantage is that a larger 
proportion of the variance in the dataset is explained (Tabachnick and Fidell, 2007). Further, the 
estimates of the rotated factor loadings provide the key for aggregating the detailed indicators into 
factor-specific scores (see Tables A.1.3–A.1.5 in the Appendix). We construct summary 
indicators of the sub-domains by aggregating the detailed indicators using the weights estimated 
by means of factor analysis (see Table A.1.6 in the Appendix). The interpretation of these weights 
obtained by squaring and normalizing the factor loadings, is as follows: the squared factor 
loadings represent the proportion of the total unit variance of the indicator explained by the factor. 
We aggregate these summary indicators into a global index: the ESG index (ESGGI). Thus, the 
ESGGI results from factor analysis, in which each ESG component is weighted according to its 
contribution to the overall data variance. Hence, the ESGGI is an index that measures the 
sustainability performance of a particular country. 
 
The sub-domain indicators used to build the ESGGI are the governance quality index (GOVI), the 
social development index (SODI), and the environmental quality index (ENVI). GOVI assesses 
regulatory effectiveness by including six sub-components: rule of law, political stability, voice of 
the people, corruption control, country effectiveness and regulatory quality. High scores signal a 
high degree of legal quality. SODI captures a country's effort in terms of human development and 
includes six sub-components: school enrollment secondary, life expectancy, health expenditure, 
ratio of female-to-male labor participation, gender parity index, and non-vulnerable employment. 
SODI is a measure of the degree of social welfare of a given country, with high scores signaling a 
high degree of social development. ENVI measures how well countries manage their natural 
resources and the degree to which they are concerned with their environment. ENVI includes six 
sub-components: air quality, wastewater treatment, sanitation, biodiversity, forest cover, and 
renewable energy. High scores signal strong environmental performance. 
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3.2 Sovereign bond yield spreads 
 
Data on government bond yields are from Bloomberg. We calculate sovereign bond spreads as 
the difference between the interest rate the country pays on its external US dollar–denominated 
debt and the rate offered by the US Treasury on debt of comparable maturity (Hilscher and 
Nosbusch, 2010). Typically, we consider the yield on sovereign bonds of a particular country 
minus the yield on US sovereign bonds from the yield curve for a fixed maturity; both values 
relate to end-of-year. We treat the yield on the benchmark US bond as the risk-free rate or the 
numeraire over which the country's yield spread is computed. We use both 12-month and 10-year 
benchmark country bond yields from monthly data on secondary market bond yields. 
 
3.3 Control variables 
 
In line with the literature on the determinants of sovereign risk (Attinasi et al., 2009; Barbosa and 
Costa, 2010; Afonso et al., 2012; D’Agostino and Ehrmann, 2013), we include several 
macroeconomic covariates in our model (for a detailed description, see Tables A.2.1–A.2.3 in the 
Appendix). First is GDP growth rate, which is an indicator of the evolution of a country's wealth; 
relatively high values point to the debt burden becoming easier to bear in the future. Eichengreen 
and Mody (2000) and Cantor and Packer (1996) find that high country growth rates enhance the 
ability to repay debt, thus reducing spreads. Second is the inflation rate. According to Nickel et 
al., (2009) the impact of inflation on sovereign risk reflects two opposing effects. On the one hand, 
higher inflation rates increase the country tax base and reduce the real value of outstanding debt 
denominated in domestic currency. This should overall relax the country's financing constraints 
and result in a reduction of bond spreads on foreign currency borrowing. On the other hand, higher 
inflation rates, especially if in excess of certain thresholds, are associated with increased 
macroeconomic instability and would thus be harmful to a country's creditworthiness. The overall 
expected impact of inflation on yield spreads is thus ambiguous. To assess the fiscal condition of 
a country, we rely on two variables: total public debt and primary balance, both in relation to 
GDP. Countries with higher levels of debt and/or larger fiscal deficits would be considered less 
creditworthy and this would thus amplify default risk (Attinasi et al., 2009; Sgherri and Zoli, 
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2009; Gruber and Kamin, 2012). The expected impact of both variables on sovereign bond yield 
spreads is positive. An additional variable is the current account of the balance of payments, which 
will negatively affect country bond yields. This variable is an indicator of competitiveness and 
the ability to raise funds for debt servicing. Therefore, when it improves, sovereign spreads should 
decline and sovereign ratings rise. The expected impact of the current account balance is negative. 
An additional covariate is country openness, which plays an important role in explaining an 
economy’s cost of borrowing, as the penalty for sovereign default is higher in terms of capital 
reversion in an open than in a closed economy. The higher this ratio, the greater the ability of the 
country to generate the required trade surpluses to refinance the present stock of debt, or to finance 
new debt. The expected sign of the coefficient is positive. The liquidity ratio measures access to 
credit in relation to national reserves. Here, we use the ratio of international reserves to GDP. The 
lower the ratio of international reserves to GDP, the greater the threat of a sudden liquidity crisis, 
and the lower the country rating (Edwards, 1983). The expected impact of this liquidity ratio is 
negative. Finally, the sovereign credit rating reflects a country's creditworthiness; relatively high 
values represent a lower probability of default. Afonso et al. (2012) find that sovereign credit 
ratings and outlook announcements have a statistically significant negative impact on spreads. 
The expected sign of this coefficient is negative. 
 
Our sample comprises yearly observations regarding 20 countries from 1996 to 2014, resulting in 
340 observations. The country sample consists of Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, 
Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, 
Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom.
 
Throughout our analysis, the US 
does not appear, as the yield on US bonds is the risk-free rate or numeraire by which we compute 
the country’s yield spread. Lack of sustainability information constrains the inclusion of more 
countries and the examination of a longer period. 
 
Table 1 gives the average ESG global index (ESGGI), as well as the average of the three sub-
indexes for the 20 countries over the period 1996 to 2014. Further, it ranks these countries from 
the best performer (rank 1) to the worst. It shows that these countries have relatively high ratings 
for GOVI and SODI but obtain relatively poor ratings for ENVI. The variation in the ratings score 
is much larger for social and environmental than for governance. This reveals that even in this 
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sample of high-income countries that are quite homogeneous from a wealth point of view, there 
are substantial differences regarding the three ESG dimensions. The Nordic countries, New 
Zealand and Canada are at the top, and Italy, Ireland, and Greece are in the bottom positions. To 
evaluate relationships involving ESG indexes, the Spearman’s rank correlation of the aggregate 
index and its components is used; see Table 2. It shows the sub-indexes positively correlate: 
higher values of environmental quality are associated with better governance and/or more 
favorable social conditions. The correlations are far from perfect though; they range from 32% 
between ENVI and GOVI to 41% between SODI and GOVI; between SOCI and GOVI, this 
correlation is around 70%.  
 
[INSERT TABLE 1 AND 2 ABOUT HERE] 
 
4. MODEL AND METHOD 
 
This section introduces the model and explains how we estimate it. Further, we discuss how we 
account for the robustness of our analysis. 
 
4.1. Model specifications 
 
In line with our hypotheses and building on the literature (Afonso et al., 2012; Beirne and 
Fratzscher, 2013), we model the link between ESG performance and sovereign risk using a 
standard panel model with country fixed effects.2
 
In its most simple form, this approach relies on 
the following equation: 
 
𝑌𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑌𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽2𝐸𝑆𝐺𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽3 (
∆𝐺𝐷𝑃
𝐺𝐷𝑃
)
𝑖,𝑡
+ 𝛽4 (
∆𝑃
𝑃
)
𝑖,𝑡
+ 𝛽5 (
𝐷𝑒𝑏𝑡
𝐺𝐷𝑃
)
𝑖,𝑡
+ 𝛽6 (
𝑃𝐵
𝐺𝐷𝑃
)
𝑖,𝑡
+
𝛽7 (
𝐶𝐴
𝐺𝐷𝑃
)
𝑖,𝑡
+ 𝛽8 (
𝑋+𝑀
𝐺𝐷𝑃
)
𝑖,𝑡
+ 𝛽9 (
𝑅𝑒𝑠𝑒𝑟𝑣𝑒𝑠
𝐺𝐷𝑃
)
𝑖,𝑡
+ 𝛽10𝑆&𝑃𝑖,𝑡 +  𝜀𝑖,𝑡 .(1) 
 
                                                     
2 We perform a Hausman test, which clearly indicates that a fixed effects model needs to be estimated instead of a 
random effects model. The results are available upon request.  
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where i = 1 to n (number of countries) and t = 1 to T (number of periods). Equation (1) models 
sovereign bond spreads. The spreads can be either 12-month bond spreads or 10-year bond spreads; 
they are regressed on a number of covariates incorporating country-specific fixed effects. We 
include lagged sovereign bond spreads to account for the persistence inherent to spreads 
(Hallerberg and Wolff, 2008; Gerlach et al., 2010; Afonso et al., 2012). The persistent nature of 
spreads implies that the exclusion of the lagged spread term from the model would generate an 
omitted variable bias. ESG denotes the ESG indicator (ESGGI, ENVI, SODI or GOVI) and is our variable 
of interest, (
∆GDP
GDP
) denotes GDP growth, (
∆P
P
) denotes inflation rate, (
Debt
GDP
) denotes gross country debt-to-
GDP ratio, (
PB
GDP
) denotes country primary balance to GDP ratio, (
CA
GDP
) denotes current account to GDP 
ratio,  (
X+M
GDP
) denotes trade openness ratio, (
Reserves
Import
) denotes ratio of reserves to imports, and (S&P) denotes 
Standard and Poor's sovereign ratings, assigning a numerical variable of 1 to CCC, 2 to B- and so on, to 
AAA. 
 
Next, we extend the analysis by accounting for the role of the individual ESG dimensions. This 
allows us to look into the potential differences in the financial impact of separate ESG dimensions 
on sovereign bond spreads. The motivation for doing so underlies our second hypothesis (see 
Section 2). More specifically, we estimate equation (1) and replace (ESGGI) with (GOVI), 
(SODI) and (ENVI), which are the governance quality index, social development index and 
environmental quality index, respectively. The ESG (ESGGI, GOVI, SODI, ENVI) indicators are 
lagged in all models. This is because the primary scope of this study is examination of the 
relationship between ESG and sovereign risk, where ESG indicators are variables that influence 
sovereign bond spreads. Further, lagging the ESG measures helps to reduce the alleged 
endogeneity problems and simultaneity bias that may arise due to contemporaneous bidirectional 
causality between ESG issues and sovereign risk. In addition, a common practice with rating 
agencies and international organizations is to assemble the various ESG data at the end of each 
year. Therefore, lagging the ESG indicators helps to ensure that the ESG index for each country 
is public knowledge at time t and is incorporated by financial market participants in terms of price 
formation. 
 
We also investigate the sensitivity of the analysis for institutional and historical factors. Beirne 
and Fratzscher (2013) argue that sovereign risk is substantially underpriced during the pre-crisis 
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period of 2000–2007, especially in more peripheral economies that use the euro (Greece, Ireland, 
Portugal, Spain and Italy). They argue that public debt levels, fiscal deficits and the current 
account of the balance of payments explain very little of the pricing of risk in euro area countries 
before the crisis, but have much more explanatory power for sovereign risk in other advanced 
economies. Beirne and Fratzscher (2013) argue that the small spreads and very high co-
movements of sovereign yields within the euro area suggest that other factors may have been key 
determinants of sovereign debt (and risk) (Cesare et al., 2012; Hochstein, 2013; Fontana and 
Scheicher, 2016). Therefore, we will compare two different subsets of the sample: One relates to 
the institutional setting and compares euro countries with non-euro countries; the other relates to 
the historical setting and compares pre- and post-GFC effects. 
 
Blundell–Wignall (2012) notes that the euro exposes its member states to asymmetric real shocks 
through external competitiveness and trade. With the inability to adjust the exchange rate, these 
pressures are forced into the labor market and may have led some euro members to try to alleviate 
pressures with fiscal slippage, contributing to underlying financial instability (Blundell–Wignall, 
2012). The prevailing working assumption of financial markets, that a sovereign default within 
the currency union is almost impossible, explains why the price of sovereign risk in the eurozone 
is not determined by fundamentals alone (Di Cesare et al., 2012; Hochstein, 2013; Nelson, 2013; 
Papanikos, 2014). Thus, the interest rates of eurozone government bonds may insufficiently 
reflect the credit risk of individual countries. As a result, investors in euro member sovereign debt 
may be more sensitive to ESG performance compared to other advanced economies. Therefore, 
we investigate whether the effect of ESG performance on sovereign bond spreads is more 
pronounced in euro countries than in other OECD member states. 
 
Ebner (2009) examines sovereign government bond spreads in crisis and non-crisis periods and 
argues that there is a significant difference in government bond spread determinants during such 
periods. He finds that during a crisis period, macroeconomic factors become less significant 
explanatory variables, while other factors like political uncertainty, market instability, and global 
factors play a more important role in explaining spreads. Dailami et al. (2008) propose a 
framework in which the probability of default is a nonlinear function of the risk-free rate (US 
Treasuries), implying that the US interest rate alone is not sufficient to explain the spread. 
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Interactions with the severity of debt dynamics, global liquidity conditions, appetite for risk, and 
shock indicators are also important and one has to differentiate between crisis and non-crisis 
periods. Bernoth et al. (2004) and Bernoth and Erdogan (2012) observe that the general pricing 
of risk has increased over time in the EMU. Therefore, we seek to examine the extent to which 
the determinants of spreads may have changed between the pre- and post-crisis periods. 
 
4.2. Econometric strategy 
 
A major concern is that the lagged dependent variable on the right-hand side of the model might 
be serially correlated and hence correlated with the error term, which makes the LSDV (least 
squares dummy variable) and OLS (ordinary least squares) estimators biased and inconsistent 
(Baltagi and Chang, 1994). More specifically, the OLS coefficient for the lagged dependent 
variable is biased upwards, while the LSDV estimator is biased downwards (Nickell, 1981). 
Therefore, a consistent estimate should lie between the two estimators (LSDV and OLS). To this 
end, Kiviet (1995) derives an approximation for the bias of the LSDV estimator when the errors 
are serially uncorrelated and the regressors are exogenous, and proposes an estimator that results 
from subtracting a consistent estimate of this bias from the LSDV estimator. Using Monte Carlo 
simulations, Judson and Owen (1999) show that with balanced dynamic panels characterized by 
N < 20 and T <50 as is the case here, the Kiviet corrected LSDV (LSDVC) estimator of the 
coefficient on the lagged dependent variable behaves better than the Anderson–Hsiao and the 
Arellano–Bond estimators.3 The idea behind LSDVC is to derive an accurate approximation of 
the LSDV bias and then remove it from the LSDV estimator. Kiviet (1995) obtains LSDVC by 
purging LSDV of bias approximations containing terms of at most order N
–1 
T
–1
. Kiviet (1999) 
provides a further refinement with approximations of at most order N
–1
T
–2
. Bun and Kiviet 
(2003) obtain formulas that are as accurate as Kiviet’s (1999) but easier to implement and argue 
that LSDVC is a suitable tool of inference in dynamic panel models with a small number of cross-
sectional units. Bruno (2005) computes the bias correction for unbalanced dynamic panels, 
making it possible to have missing values in the dataset. However, unlike previous estimators that 
                                                     
3 With unbalanced panels, by the time T reaches 30, Judson and Owen find the LSDV estimator without bias correction 
is superior to the Arellano-Bond estimators. Bruno (2005) develops the LSDVC estimator for an unbalanced panel. 
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allow effective estimation in the presence of endogenous regressors (GMM estimator, System 
GMM estimator), the LSDVC estimators assume weak exogeneity (Kiviet, 1999). 
 
Of course, all estimators have advantages and disadvantages given the size of our panel and our 
study object. However, to eliminate inefficient estimators, we first perform the OLS and LSDV 
(fixed effect) regression. The estimation results display bounds on the coefficient of the lagged 
dependent variables. Then, we estimate model (1) with the estimators of Anderson and Hsiao 
(1982) in difference and in level, the GMM estimators of Arellano–Bond (1991) and Bundell and 
Bond (1998) and the LSDVC estimator of Bruno (2005). Further, we use auto-correlation tests, 
over-identification tests, as well as tests of endogeneity for each explanatory variable.4 Of the five 
candidate estimators, only one provides the coefficient on the lagged dependent variable in the 
bounds of its OLS and FE counterparts, namely the LSDVC estimator of Bruno (2005).5 The 
endogeneity tests confirm the efficiency of this estimator, as all explanatory variables are 
exogenous, except for the lagged dependent variable. 
 
4.3. Robustness 
 
Next to these estimations, we perform a number of robustness checks. First, we assess the extent 
to which the coefficients change if we exclude the sovereign ratings as a potential input factor 
from our statistical analysis. Altman and Saunders (2001) argue that the ability of ratings to predict 
default is poor and, hence, their usefulness for the calculation of risk weights is limited. Their 
arguments suggest that rating agencies provide little if any new information to the market, but 
rather reflect information already incorporated in market prices. Yet, according to Hochstein 
(2013), adding sovereign ratings may improve the explanatory power of sovereign spread models. 
 
Second, we remove Greece because we suspect this country may be an outlier because of its fiscal 
problems and the special treatment it received from international monetary and fiscal authorities 
(see Di Cesare et al., 2012; Georgoutsos and Migiakis, 2013; Papanikos, 2014).  
 
                                                     
4 These results are available upon request. 
5 Bloom et al. (2007), Potrafke (2010), Celasum and Harms (2010), de Rassenfosse and van Pottelsberghe de la 
Potterie (2012) are notable examples of applications of LSDVC to panels with a small number of countries.   
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Third, we back-test our models by generating in-sample predictions for bond spreads, which are 
compared with the actual bond spreads. As such, we follow the suggestion by Berg and Pattillo 
(1998), Kumar et al. (2003) and Comelli (2012). In this regard, we proceed as follows. The time 
dimension of our panel consists of T observations. We re-estimate the model using the data in a 
subsample comprising t < T observations (the estimation sample) to generate bond spread 
forecasts in the remainder (T – t) of the whole sample (the forecasting sample). We re-estimate 
bond spreads for the periods 1996–2006, 1996–2007 and 1996–2008 (the estimation samples) to 
forecast bond spreads in the periods 2007–2014, 2008–2014 and 2009–2014, respectively (the 
forecasting samples). The purpose of this exercise is to investigate whether the model can 
accurately predict bond spreads in periods that are not included in the estimation sample. We use 
different estimation samples because we want to determine whether the in-sample forecasting 
ability of the model changes with the beginning of the GFC. We use linear prediction (LP) 
methods to generate in-sample predictions for bond spreads. We re-estimate the model in the 
estimation sample and obtain the coefficient estimates.6 Then, in the forecasting sample, we 
multiply the explanatory variables by the estimated coefficients to generate bond spread forecasts 
for all sample countries. To assess the model’s ability to generate informative in-sample bond 
spread predictions, we proceed as follows. In each year of the forecasting sample, we assign a 
value of 1 if actual and predicted bond spreads change in the same direction (e.g., they both 
increase or decrease). Otherwise, if actual and predicted spreads change in the opposite direction, 
we assign a value of zero. We then calculate the probability that the LP forecasting method 
correctly predicts the direction of yearly changes in actual bond spreads. 
 
5. RESULTS 
 
5.1 Main results 
 
We first estimate equation (1) (basic and extended with individual ESG dimensions) for the full 
sample period and report the results from the LSDVC estimations in Table 3. 
                                                     
6 We calculate LP from the fitted model. The model can be thought of as estimating a set of parameters b1, b2, ..., bk, 
and the LP is ypj=b1x1j+b2x2j+…+bkxkj where j=t+1, t+2, ..T. The values ypj are the out-of-sample predictions; x1j, 
x2j…xkj  are the values of the explanatory variables in the forecasting period and are not used to fit the model (hence to 
obtain b1, b2,… , bk). 
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[INSERT TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE] 
 
The results show that the yield spreads appear to be highly persistent. We also obtain statistically 
significant coefficients with the expected signs throughout for the competitiveness and fundraising 
ability indicators (i.e., current account of balance of payments) and financial ratings (S&P rating). 
The estimated ESG coefficients are negative and statistically significant at the 1% level, except for 
ENVI, suggesting that high country ESG scores reduce the spreads. To be specific, the ESGGI 
coefficient is 0.153. Specifically, in terms of magnitude, this means that an increase of 10 percent 
in ESGGI reduces 10-year sovereign spreads by approximately 16%. Therefore, we conclude that 
the results support our hypothesis that there is a negative association between ESG and sovereign 
yield spreads (H1). 
 
These results show that there is value added by incorporating ESG into sovereign risk analysis. 
In addition to the conventional factors (fundraising ability and credit risk), there is a discernible 
financial effect of sustainability-related information on sovereign spreads. The literature argues 
that there are three types of potential determinants that may affect spreads (Attinasi et al., 2009; 
Afonso et al., 2012): credit risk (i.e., a country's creditworthiness as reflected by its fiscal and 
macroeconomic position), liquidity risk (i.e., the size and depth of a government’s bond market), 
and international risk aversion (i.e., investor sentiment toward this class of assets for each 
country). We show that ESG matters for the evolution of government bond spreads too, as there 
is a significant association between ESG and sovereign spreads. As such, we conclude that ESG 
is material when it comes to sovereign bond yield spreads. 
 
Table 3 also allows us to examine the nature of the effects of ESG on spreads by separately 
examining the ESG components (right-hand column). We verify the interest-reducing effects of 
country sustainability and it appears they are associated with governance and social factors. 
However, there is no relationship between environmental factors and sovereign bond spreads. The 
negative and significant coefficients of SODI and GOVI suggest that good social and governance 
performance may be associated with lower sovereign bond spreads. The economic magnitude of 
a change in the country governance score on sovereign spreads is larger than the impact of an 
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equal change in the social score: a 10 percent unit increase in the governance dimension decreases 
10-year sovereign bond spreads by approximately 7.4% compared to 4.9% for the same increase 
in the social dimension. These findings support our second hypothesis regarding the three 
dimensions having a heterogeneous impact on sovereign bond yield spreads. It shows that 
governance concerns are the most relevant ESG issue for sovereign risk analysis, social concerns 
are in second place, and environmental indicators do not appear to play a role here. The latter 
finding contrasts with some of the findings of Berg et al. (2016), who study emerging markets.  
 
5.2 Sensitivity and robustness analysis 
 
We conduct several sensitivity analyses along institutional and historical lines. First, we split the 
sample into countries that use the euro as their currency and those that do not. Table 4 depicts the 
influence of overall country ESG scores on 10-year sovereign spreads by distinguishing between 
euro area and non-euro area countries. This table shows that the interest-reducing effect of country 
ESG performance on 10-year spreads holds in both areas. Further, the coefficient of ESGGI, 
estimated at 0.122 in non-euro countries and at 0.212 in euro countries, suggests that the 
relationship between country ESG performance and sovereign bond spreads is stronger in the 
eurozone. Hence, sustainability seems to have a stronger impact on spreads in euro area countries. 
However, the differential between the two is only marginally significant. 
 
[INSERT TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE] 
 
Next, we split the sample into two sub-periods, namely the period preceding the GFC (1996–
2006) and the crisis period (2007–2014). The results produced by these analyses are in Table 5 
and provide a very clear picture. We establish that in the wake of the GFC, ESG performance is a 
significant factor regarding sovereign bond spreads. This confirms the assumption that during 
crisis periods, ESG sustainability indicators help inform investors about country risk. 
 
[INSERT TABLE 5 ABOUT HERE] 
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We also conduct robustness checks to investigate the sensitivity of our results to modeling 
choices. We exclude Standard and Poor's ratings from our control variables and remove Greece 
from the sample. Further, we back-test our model by generating in-sample predictions that are 
then compared with the actual bond spreads. Table 6 shows that all coefficients of ESGGI have 
the same sign and significance when Greece and the S&P rating are excluded. The coefficients 
are larger when we exclude the S&P credit ratings indicator from the explanatory variables, which 
suggests sovereign credit ratings capture some of the effects measured by ESGGI. 
 
[INSERT TABLE 6 ABOUT HERE] 
 
Finally, for each country, we consider the probability that the LP method correctly predicts the 
direction of the yearly change in actual bond spreads.7 We consider LP to perform well in 
predicting the direction of the yearly change in bond spreads if, for a given country, the probability 
is above 0.7 in every forecasting period. By contrast, the model performs poorly if, for a given 
country, the probability is below 0.6 in any forecast period. Thus, it seems that the 10-year model 
appears to succeed in predicting movements in bond spreads for all countries for which the 
probability is above 0.6. Further, on average, the probability that the LP method correctly predicts 
the direction of the yearly change in actual bond spreads is lower in the period 2008–2014. 
 
Thus, we establish that institutional environment and especially history can play a role as to the 
sensitivity of sovereign bond yield spreads in relation to ESG performance. Further, we conclude 
that the results from the estimations of our model are robust to changes in the model and to 
adjustments in sample composition. 
 
6. CONCLUSION 
 
Especially since the European sovereign debt crisis, many policymakers and investors have sought 
a better understanding of sovereign risk and its impact on investment returns. As part of this trend 
toward broader risk analysis, some observers argue that sustainability should be integrated in 
analysis and policy. They argue sustainability has a significant impact on a country's 
                                                     
7 Results available upon request. 
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creditworthiness and, therefore, it is a potential risk factor, along with traditional sovereign risk 
factors like public debt, inflation, and GDP growth. The reasons for this specific relationship are 
that good sustainability signals a country’s long-term commitment and might act as a buffer 
against shocks. More sustainable countries are less risky and face lower financing costs. 
 
We assess the value added of including sustainability in conventional sovereign risk analysis. To 
this extent, we construct a sustainability index that relies on several indicators relating to various 
subdimensions, namely governance and social and environmental factors. We include 
sustainability (and, separately, the subdimensions) as a covariate in our model, which attempts to 
explain sovereign bond spreads and relies on dynamic panel regressions with data from 20 
developed countries for the period 1996–2014. This allows us to illustrate the complexity and 
variability of the economic impact of the ESG performance on sovereign risk. 
 
We find that there is a strong negative relationship between overall ESG performance and 
sovereign bond spreads. Hence, sovereign bond markets price country ESG factors. It appears that 
above-average ESG performance is associated with less default risk and, thus, with lower 
sovereign bond spreads. This result is in line with evidence from private bond markets (see 
Hoepner et al., 2016) and seems highly relevant when designing strategic international asset 
allocations. Second, the financial impact of governance factors is more pronounced compared to 
that of social and environmental factors. Third, the relationship between ESG factors and 
sovereign spreads in euro area countries is somewhat stronger than in other developed countries. 
Fourth, the relationship between ESG performance and sovereign spreads is stronger in the wake 
of the GFC than in the pre-crisis period. Robustness checks regarding model specification, 
sampling, and estimation method support these results. Our in-depth assessment of the 
relationship between country risk, as indicated by sovereign bond spreads, and ESG is interesting 
and relevant from several perspectives. From the academic perspective, we provide a more 
complete and thorough understanding of the relationship between country risk and sustainability 
performance because we show sustainability significantly influences country ratings. For policy 
makers and investors, our results show the importance of considering sustainability criteria at the 
macro-level when assessing or managing risk. 
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There are limitations of our analysis due to data availability. This relates to the validity and 
reliability of variables that proxy for ESG factors, as well as to their coverage, which is limited to 
a select number of countries. However, we expect that with the propagation of the UN’s 
Sustainable Development Goals and their growing use worldwide by policy makers, business and 
society, this will improve over the next decade. The process by which we assess country 
sustainability characteristics leads to the creation of a single rating and corresponding score for 
each dimension (i.e., environment, social, governance). Although this is highly useful from a 
practical point of view, some suggest that ESG issues (or sustainability) should always be 
disaggregated into those related to positive and those related to negative social/environmental 
performance, as these are conceptually and practically different and thus so are their financial 
outcomes (Chatterji et al., 2009). It would also be worthwhile to include more countries, 
especially developing countries, in the analysis as well as to estimate the model over a much 
longer time span. Finally, alternative methodologies can be considered. First, although bond 
market event studies are not straightforward (Bessembinder et al., 2009; Ederington et al., 2015), 
one might conduct an event study, similar, for instance, to Capelle–Blancard and Laguna (2010) 
to assess the impact of ESG news on yield spreads. Second, it would be interesting to use a 
difference-in-difference framework, if there is access to an appropriate quasi-experiment. These 
methods may prove relevant, and we leave this for future research. 
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 Highlights 
 
 
 
Sovereign bond yield spreads and sustainability: 
An empirical analysis of OECD countries 
 
 
 
 
 
 
HIGHLIGHTS 
 
 We study how sustainability affects sovereign bond spreads. 
 We find that countries with good sustainability performance tend to have less default 
risk and lower bond spreads. 
 In particular, governance and social factors appear to have an impact, but 
environmental factors do not. 
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Table 1: ESGGI, GOVI, SODI and ENVI: scores and rank 
 
ESG Score ESGGI GOVI SODI ENVI 
Score rank Score Rank Score Rank Score Rank 
Norway 87.95 1 96.31 6 82.53 1 76.57 1 
New Zealand 82.95 2 97.20 3 76.40 6 60.36 2 
Sweden 82.13 3 96.89 4 81.95 2 54.66 5 
Finland 79.95 4 98.58 1 79.32 4 45.12 8 
Canada 79.71 5 94.46 8 76.30 7 55.09 4 
Austria 79.61 6 94.01 9 72.45 13 60.36 2 
Switzerland 78.20 7 96.45 5 71.56 15 52.02 6 
Denmark 77.55 8 97.78 2 80.65 3 37.63 11 
Netherland 74.31 9 96.31 6 75.67 9 43.43 9 
Australia 71.78 10 93.61 10 76.44 5 27.74 19 
Japan 71.27 11 84.41 16 71.61 14 46.59 7 
UK 71.17 12 91.57 11 74.50 10 30.97 18 
Germany 71.00 13 91.50 12 73.42 12 33.61 14 
France 70.50 14 86.69 14 76.29 8 34.66 13 
Belgium 70.04 15 88.90 13 73.71 11 32.06 16 
Spain 67.66 17 82.41 18 69.03 17 39.48 10 
Portugal 67.26 16 85.28 15 66.72 18 35.31 12 
Italy 61.65 18 71.90 19 62.75 19 31.09 17 
Ireland 60.91 19 82.64 17 70.64 16 32.84 15 
Greece 58.19 20 70.93 20 61.15 20 30.06 20 
Mean 73.63 90.38 73.63 42.96 
St.dev  7.18 8.13 6.11 13.06 
(a) We rank countries, respectively, from the highest performing with regard to governance, social policy 
and environmental quality to the lowest performing. The scores are averaged over the period 1996–2012. 
ESGGI is the overall country sustainability index score and obtained by means of factor analysis, in which 
each component of the ESG framework is weighted according to its contribution to the overall variance 
in the data (see Table A.1.6 in the Appendix). The sub-domain indicators used to build ESGGI are 
governance quality index (GOVI), social development index (SODI) and environmental quality index 
(ENVI) (see Table A.1.2). GOVI assesses regulatory effectiveness by including six sub-components: rule 
of law, political stability, voice of the people, corruption control, country effectiveness and regulatory 
quality. High scores signal a high degree of legal quality. SODI captures a country's effort in terms of 
human development and includes six sub-components: school enrollment secondary, life expectancy, 
health expenditure, ratio of female-to-male labor participation, gender parity index, and non-vulnerable 
employment. SODI is a measure of the degree of social welfare of a given country, with high scores 
signaling a high degree of social development. ENVI measures how well countries manage their natural 
resources and the degree to which they are concerned with their environment. ENVI includes six sub-
components: air quality, wastewater treatment, sanitation, biodiversity, forest cover, and renewable 
energy. High scores signal strong environmental performance. 
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Table 2: Spearman's rank correlation of the ESG scores 
 
 ESGGI GOVI SODI ENVI 
ESGGI 1.00    
GOVI 0.85*** 1.00   
SOCI 0.81*** 0.70*** 1.00  
ENVI 0.75*** 0.32*** 0.41*** 1.00 
* significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%. 
This table shows the Spearman rank correlations of the overall country 
sustainability index ESGGI and the three sub-domain indicators GOVI 
for the governance quality index, SODI for the social development index, 
and ENVI for the environmental quality index. For contents of the 
indexes see Table A.1.2. For construction of the ESGGI see Table A.1.6. 
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Table 3: Sovereign bond spreads: effect of global and individual 
dimensions of ESG performance 
 
 Sovereign bond spread (Yi,t) 
10YR 
 Basic Extended 
Y(lagged) 0.560*** 0.558*** 
 (0.049) (0.049) 
ESGGI(lagged)  –0.153***  
 (0.072)  
GOVI (lagged)  –0.074*** 
  (0.033) 
SODI(lagged)  –0.049*** 
  (0.024) 
ENVI(lagged)  –0.030 
  (0.040) 
ΔGDP/GDP 0.040 0.052 
 (0.037) (0.038) 
ΔP/P –0.062 –0.056 
 (0.063) (0.063) 
Debt/GDP 0.005 0.007* 
 (0.004) (0.004) 
PB/GDP 0.029 0.033 
 (0.026) (0.025) 
CA/GDP –0.046* –0.054*** 
 (0.023) (0.025) 
(X+M)/GDP –0.011 –0.010 
 (0.009) (0.009) 
Reserves/import –0.570 –0.666 
 (0.460) (0.471) 
S&P –0.336*** –0.382*** 
 (0.056) (0.065) 
Time effects Yes Yes 
Observations 360 360 
R–squared 0.70 0.43 
Notes: Bootstrap standard errors based on 500 replications are reported in parentheses under the 
coefficient value: * significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%. 
This table shows the LSDVC estimation results for equation (1) for the complete sample period. 
The column basic relates to the model which includes the overall country sustainability index 
ESGGI and the column extended relates to the model which includes the three sub-domain 
indexes, namely the governance index (GOVI), the social development index (SODI), and the 
environmental quality index (ENVI). ΔGDP/GDP is GDP growth, ΔP/P is inflation, Debt/GDP 
is the debt ratio, PB/GDP is the primary net lending/borrowing plus net interest payable/paid over 
GDP, CA/CDP is the current account, (X+M)/GDP is for trade openness, Reserves/import is the 
liquidity ratio, and S&P is the sovereign credit risk rating from S&P (see Table A.2.1 in the 
Appendix). 
 
  
31  
Table 4: Sovereign bond spreads: euro-area and non-euro area 
economies 
 
 Sovereign bond spread (Yi,t) 
10YR 
 EURO NON-EURO 
Y(lagged) 0.552*** 0.877*** 
 (0.071) (0.067) 
ESGGI(lagged)  –0.212* –0.122*** 
 (0.124) (0.037) 
ΔGDP/GDP 0.053 0.021 
 (0.051) (0.031) 
ΔP/P –0.169* 0.037 
 (0.100) (0.036) 
Debt/GDP 0.001 –0.000 
 (0.007) (0.003) 
PB/GDP 0.004 0.030 
 (0.042) (0.016) 
CA/GDP –0.069* –0.020 
 (0.042) (0.014) 
(X+M)/GDP –0.011 0.006 
 (0.019) (0.005) 
Reserves/import –0.508 –0.264 
 (0.180) (0.210) 
S&P –0.334*** –0.011 
 (0.084) (0.062) 
Time effects Yes Yes 
Observations 198 162 
R–squared 0.72 0.92 
Notes: Bootstrap standard errors based on 500 replications are reported in parentheses under 
the coefficient value: * significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%. 
This table shows the LSDVC estimation results for equation (1) for the complete sample 
period. The column EURO relates to the sample where we include OECD countries which 
use the Euro as their currency (Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, 
Italy, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain) and the column extended relates to the sample which has 
the other OECD countries (Australia, Austria, Canada, Denmark, Japan, New Zealand, 
Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom). The US is used as the numeraire. 
ESGGI is for the overall country sustainability index, ΔGDP/GDP is GDP growth, ΔP/P is 
inflation, Debt/GDP is the debt ratio, PB/GDP is the primary net lending/borrowing plus net 
interest payable/paid over GDP, CA/CDP is the current account, (X+M)/GDP is for trade 
openness, Reserves/import is the liquidity ratio, and S&P is the sovereign credit risk rating 
from S&P (see Table A.2.1 in the Appendix). 
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Table 5: Sovereign bond spreads: coefficient estimates, 
 accounting for GFC 
 
 Sovereign bond spread (Yi,t) 
(10-year) 
 1996–2006 2007–2014 
Y(lagged) 0.624*** 0.521*** 
 (0.039) (0.099) 
ESGGI(lagged) –0.037 –0.516*** 
 (0.026) (0.277) 
ΔGDP/GDP 0.035* –0.038 
 (0.019) (0.095) 
ΔP/P 0.022 –0.323* 
 (0.024) (0.168) 
Debt/GDP 0.005* –0.015 
 (0.003) (0.015) 
PB/GDP –0.004 0.023 
 (0.013) (0.068) 
CA/GDP –0.006 –0.030 
 (0.010) (0.077) 
(X+M)/GDP –0.004 –0.056* 
 (0.004) (0.031) 
Reserves/import 0.074 –0.100 
 (0.211) (1.486) 
S&P –0.048 –0.420*** 
 (0.046) (0.122) 
Time effects Yes Yes 
Observations 200 160 
R–squared 0.70 0.60 
Notes: Bootstrap standard errors based on 500 replications are reported in parentheses under 
the coefficient value: * significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%. 
This table shows the LSDVC estimation results for equation (1) for the two periods: the pre-
crisis period (1996-2006) and the Global Financial Crisis and its aftermath (2007-2014). 
ESGGI is for the overall country sustainability index, ΔGDP/GDP is GDP growth, ΔP/P is 
inflation, Debt/GDP is the debt ratio, PB/GDP is the primary net lending/borrowing plus net 
interest payable/paid over GDP, CA/CDP is the current account, (X+M)/GDP is for trade 
openness, Reserves/import is the liquidity ratio, and S&P is the sovereign credit risk rating 
from S&P (see Table A.2.1 in the Appendix). 
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Table 6: Sovereign bond spreads: robustness checks 
 
 Sovereign bond spread (Yi,t) 
10-year 
 Basic Excluding 
Greece 
Excluding 
S&P 
Y(lagged) 0.560*** 0.584*** 0.786*** 
 (0.049) (0.053) (0.048) 
ESGGI(lagged) –0.153*** –0.113*** –0.207*** 
 (0.072) (0.041) (0.075) 
ΔGDP/GDP 0.040 0.001 0.065* 
 (0.037) (0.022) (0.038) 
ΔP/P –0.062 –0.017 –0.012* 
 (0.063) (0.037) (0.067) 
Debt/GDP 0.005 –0.006*** 0.002 
 (0.004) (0.003) (0.004) 
PB/GDP 0.029 0.028*** 0.040 
 (0.026) (0.014) (0.028) 
CA/GDP –0.046* –0.011 –0.029 
 (0.023) (0.015) (0.025) 
(X+M)/GDP –0.011 –0.001 –0.001 
 (0.009) (0.006) (0.010) 
Reserves/import –0.570 –0.280 –0.760*** 
 (0.460) (0.278) (0.503) 
S&P –0.336*** –0.161***  
 (0.056) (0.035)  
Time effects Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 360 324 360 
R–squared 0.70 0.75 0.67 
Notes: Bootstrap standard errors based on 500 replications are reported in parentheses under 
the coefficient value: * significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%. 
This table shows the LSDVC estimation results for equation (1) for the base model (basic) 
and for two robustness checks. In column Excluding Greece, we exclude Greece from the 
sample. In column Excluding S&P we exclude the variable S&P sovereign credit risk rating 
from the estimations. ESGGI is for the overall country sustainability index, ΔGDP/GDP is 
GDP growth, ΔP/P is inflation, Debt/GDP is the debt ratio, PB/GDP is the primary net 
lending/borrowing plus net interest payable/paid over GDP, CA/CDP is the current account, 
(X+M)/GDP is for trade openness, Reserves/import is the liquidity ratio, and S&P is the 
sovereign credit risk rating from S&P (see Table A.2.1 in the Appendix). 
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APPENDIX 
 
A.1: Principal component analysis 
 
Principal component analysis (PCA) is a multivariate statistical technique that, when applied to a 
dataset, reveals which variables in the set form coherent subsets that are relatively independent of 
one another. Variables that are highly correlated are combined into components. The components 
are expected to reveal the underlying processes that created the correlation among the variables 
(Tabachnick and Fidell, 2007). PCA aims to extract the maximum variance from a dataset with each 
component (Tabachnick and Fidell, 2007) as the first principal component is the linear combination 
of observed variables that maximally separate subjects by maximizing the variance of their 
components scores. The second component is computed from the residual correlations; it is the linear 
combination of observed variables that extracts maximum variability. This variability is uncorrelated 
to the first component. The subsequent components also extract maximum variability from the 
residual correlations and are independent from all other components (Tabachnick and Fidell, 2007). 
The extracted components represent most of the variance of the original dataset and can be used in 
further analysis. In mathematical terms, PCA can be explained as follows: From a set of variables 
X1, X2 to Xn, the principal components PC1 to PCm are extracted: 
 
PC1 = a11X1 + a12X2 + … a1nXn … PCm 
= am1X1 + am2X2 + ⋯ amnXn 
 
where amn represents the weight for the m
th principal component and the nth variable. The weights 
of each principal component are given by the eigenvectors of the correlation matrix or the co-
variance matrix. The variance () for each principal component is given by the eigenvalue of the 
corresponding eigenvector. 
 
The PCA conducted in this paper involves several steps: 
1. For the factor analysis to yield meaningful results, the variables in the dataset have to be 
related to each other: if the correlations between variables are small, it is unlikely that they share 
common factors. This paper relies on the Kaiser–Meyer–Olkin (KMO) measure to test the correlation 
of the basic indicators. The KMO statistic is a ratio of the sum of squared correlations to the sum of 
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squared correlations plus the sum of squared partial correlations (Tabachnick and Fidell, 2007). The 
KMO statistic should be at least 0.6 in order to proceed with factor analysis (Kaiser and Rice, 1974). 
 
2. The second step involves factor extraction, i.e., identification of the number of factors 
necessary to represent the data and the method for calculating them. Each factor is defined as a set 
of coefficients (so-called loadings), each measuring the correlation between the individual indicators 
and the latent factor. PCA is used to extract the factors. In PCA, linear combinations of the basic 
indicators are formed as follows: the first principal component is the combination that accounts for 
the largest amount of variability in the sample. The second principal component accounts for the next 
largest amount of variance and is uncorrelated with the first. Successive components explain smaller 
and smaller portions of the sample variance and are all uncorrelated with each other. 
3. The third step involves the rotation of factors. Rotation is a standard step in factor 
analysis. It provides a criterion for eliminating the indeterminacy implicit in factor analysis results. 
The rotation changes the factor loadings and consequently the interpretation of the factors, but the 
different factor analytical solutions are mathematically equivalent in that they explain the same 
portion of the sample variance. Factor rotation is obtained using the varimax method, which attempts 
to minimize the number of variables that have high loadings (so-called salient loadings) on the same 
factor. This is a transformation of factorial axes that makes it possible to approximate a “simple 
structure” of the factors, in which each indicator is “loaded” exclusively on one of the retained 
factors. This enhances the interpretability of these factors. 
4. The final step involves construction of the weights used to construct the summary 
indicators. The approach followed in this paper is to weight each detailed indicator according to the 
proportion of its variance explained by the factor it is associated with (i.e., the normalized squared 
loading), while each factor is weighted according to its contribution to the portion of the explained 
variance in the dataset (i.e., the normalized sum of squared loadings). 
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Table A.1.1: ESG analysis dimensions 
 
 
Dimensions of ESG 
included in reports 
VIGEO HBC 
AM 
Natixis 
AM 
MSCI 
ESG 
Neuberger 
Berman 
Environmental Air quality X X X X  
 Water and sanitation X X X X  
 Forests X X X X X 
 Renewable energy X     
Social Human capital X  X  X 
 Demography  X X   
 Health X X X X  
 Gender equality X     
 Employment X X X   
Governance Democratic 
institution 
X X  X  
 Safe y policy X    X 
 
 
 
Table A.1.2: Items used to assess ESG performance 
 
 
Dimension Measuring items Code Source  
Environmental    
Air quality Control air pollution Air WDI 
Water and sanitation Waste water treatment Waste WDI 
Forests Forest area (% of land area) Forest WDI 
Renewable energy Combustible renewable energy (% of total energy)   Combust WDI 
 Renewable electricity output (% of total electricity) Electricity WDI 
 Renewable energy consumption (% of total energy) Energy WDI 
Social    
Human capital School enrollment secondary (% gross) Enroll WDI 
Demography Life expectancy Life WDI 
Health Health expenditure, public (% of total health expenditure) Health WDI 
Gender equality Ratio of female-to-male labor force participation rate (%) Femaletomale WDI 
 Gender parity index  GPI WDI 
Employment Non-vulnerable employment (% of total employment) Nonvulnerable WDI 
Governance    
Democratic institution Control of corruption Corruption WGI 
 Rule of law Rule WGI 
 Voice and accountability Voice WGI 
Safety policy Country effectiveness Effectiveness WGI 
 Political stability Stability WGI 
 Regulatory quality Regulatory WGI 
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Table A.1.3: Descriptive statistics of ESG dataset 
 
Variable Mean St. dev. Min Max 
Air 74.22 19.43 10.26 98.53 
Waste 72.35 20.79 4.00 100.00 
Forest 33.63 18.27 0.23 73.70 
Combust 70.19 25.86 3.14 100.00 
Electricity 27.76 27.59 0.04 99.99 
Energy 16.71 15.59 0.61 77.36 
Enroll 105.02 15.64 59.40 164.81 
Health 71.59 11.84 36.62 92.81 
Life 79.94 11.36 37.42 99.41 
Nonvulnerable 86.49 9.01 42.82 97.21 
Femaletomale 74.89 11.40 30.55 94.06 
GPI 1.00 0.04 0.80 1.15 
Corruption 83.61 15.23 23.90 100.00 
Rule 84.60 15.01 24.88 100.48 
Voice 84.92 13.79 23.56 100.96 
Effectiveness 86.04 11.21 45.85 100.49 
Stability 72.56 22.59 7.11 100.00 
Regulatory 86.33 10.31 54.90 101.47 
Notes: The Kaiser–Meyer–Olkin (KMO) test for sampling adequacy, overall MSA. The KMO 
statistic is a ratio of the sum of squared correlations to the sum of squared correlations plus the 
sum of squared partial correlations. The KMO statistic should be at least 0.6 to proceed with 
factor analysis. 
 
 
 
Table A.1.4: Total variance explained by the eigenvalue of the extracted components 
 
Component Eigenvalue Difference Proportion Cumulative 
1 8.39 5.71 0.47 0.47 
2 2.69 1.36 0.15 0.62 
3 1.33 0.33 0.08 0.70 
Notes: The eigenvalue (variance) for each principal component indicates the percentage of 
variation explained in the total dataset. Using the Kaiser's criterion or the eigenvalue rule, 
components with an eigenvalue of 1.0 or more are extracted. According to these criteria, 
the indicators are correlated with three main factors, which account for 70 per cent of total 
variance. 
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Table A.1.5: Principal component analysis (PCA) results 
 
Variables  Component1 Component2 Component3 
Air –0.01 0.45 0.71 
Waste –0.67 –0.25 0.24 
Forest 0.15 0.31 0.35 
Combustion 0.17 –0.21 0.70 
Electricity 0.14 0.02 0.93 
Energy 0.00 0.23 0.90 
Enroll 0.49 0.48 –0.03 
Life 0.38 0.80 0.24 
Health 0.25 0.47 0.09 
Femaletomale 0.39 0.81 0.23 
GPI 0.17 0.59 –0.05 
Nonvulnerable 0.51 0.67 0.07 
Corruption 0.90 0.24 0.17 
Rule 0.91 0.26 0.18 
Voice 0.83 0.40 0.19 
Effectiveness 0.90 0.27 0.17 
Stability 0.60 0.30 0.33 
Regulatory 0.86 0.28 0.10 
Total variance explained by factors (%) 46.69 14.93 7.86 
Eigenvalue 8.38 2.69 1.33 
(a) = Based on rotated component matrix. 
(b) = 0.71 is the factor loading on the air quality variable on the third component. 
Three principal components extract most of the variance from the original dataset. Control corruption 
(0.90), rule of law (0.91), voice (0.83), effectiveness (0.90), political stability (0.60) and security and 
regulatory quality (0.86) have the highest factor loading on the first component. This component is labeled 
“governance quality index” (GOVI). This GOVI dimension explains most of the variance from the 
dataset: 46.69%. In the second component, enrollsec (0.48) health (0.47), life (0.80), non-vulnerable 
(0.67), female-to-male labor participation (0.81) and gpisecprim (0.59) loaded the highest on the 
component (this component is labeled “social development index” – SODI). This SODI dimension 
explains 14.93% of the total variance. Finally, air quality (0.71), water (0.24), forest (0.35), combust 
(0.70), electricity (0.90) and energy (0.93) are the variables with the highest factor loading on the third 
component (labeled “environmental quality index” – ENVI). This component is related to the 
environmental indicators. It explains 7.86% of total variance. 
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Table A.1.6: Construction of the ESG indexa 
 
Variables  Component1 Component2 Component3 
Air 0.00 0.00 0.17b 
Waste 0.00 0.00 0.02 
Forest 0.00 0.00 0.04 
Combust 0.00 0.00 0.17 
Electricity 0.00 0.00 0.30 
Energy 0.00 0.00 0.30 
Enroll 0.00 0.09 0.00 
Life 0.00 0.08 0.00 
Health 0.00 0.25 0.00 
Femaletomale 0.00 0.18 0.00 
GPI 0.00 0.27 0.00 
Nonvulnerable 0.00 0.13 0.00 
Corruption 0.19 0.00 0.00 
Rule 0.20 0.00 0.00 
Voice 0.16 0.00 0.00 
Effectiveness 0.19 0.00 0.00 
Stability 0.08 0.00 0.00 
Regulatory 0.18 0.00 0.00 
Total variance explained by factors (%) 0.45c 0.30 0.25 
Eigenvalue 5.65 3.52 3.27 
Total variance explained by factors (%) 46.69 14.93 7.86 
(a)=Based on rotated component matrix 
(b)=Normalized squared factor loadings 
(c)=Weighting of the intermediate composite index expressed as total percentage of explained variance 
of each component 
The approach followed in this paper is to weight each detailed indicator according to the proportion of its 
variance that is explained by the factor it is associated with (i.e., normalized squared loading), while each 
factor is weighted according to its contribution to the proportion of the explained variance in the dataset 
(i.e., normalized sum of squared loading). More precisely, at first, we identify the intermediate composite 
indexes (which refer to the extracted components). Then, each intermediate composite index is loaded by 
using the variables with the highest factor on corresponding component. The weighting of each of the 
variables is derived by squaring the factor loading of the variables. The squared factor loading represents 
the proportion of the total unit variance of the indicator, which is explained by the component. 
Specifically, the first component, which represents the first composite index: “governance quality index” 
(GOVI) is computed as follows: GOVI = 0.19*corruption +0.20*rule + 0.16*voice + 0.19*effectiveness+ 
0.08*stability+ 0.18*regulatory. Once the three intermediate composite indexes are constructed, they are 
aggregated by allocating a weight to each of them equal to the proportion of the explained variance in the 
dataset. For example, the weighting of the first intermediate composite index is 0.45 (45%), calculated as 
follows: 5.65/(5.65 + 3.52 + 3.27). In the same manner, the weights of each intermediate composite index 
in the total composite index are calculated. Note that the weighting of each consecutive intermediate 
composite index contributed less to explaining the variance in the dataset, decreasing from 46.69% to 
7.86%. The ESG global index is then obtained as follows: ESGGI = 0.45*GOVI+ 0.30*SODI + 
0.25*ENVI. 
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Table A.2.1: Description of variables 
 
Variable Name Code Description Source 
Dependent variable    
10-year sovereign 
Spread 
Spread (10YR) Spreads are yield on sovereign bonds of the considered 
country minus yield on US sovereign bonds 
Bloomberg 
Independent variable    
GDP growth ΔGDP/GDP Annual percentages of constant price GDP changes  
IMF Inflation ΔP/P Annual percentages of average consumer price 
changes 
 
 
Fiscal condition 
Debt/GDP All liabilities that require payment or payments of interest 
and/or principal by the debtor to the creditor at a date or 
dates in the future 
IMF 
PB/GDP Primary net lending/borrowing plus net interest 
payable/paid 
IMF 
Current account CA/GDP All transactions other than those in financial and 
capital items 
 
IMF 
Liquidity ratio Reserves/Import Total reserves comprise holdings of monetary gold special 
drawing rights, and holdings of foreign exchange under 
the control of monetary authorities 
WB 
Trade openness (X + M)/GDP The sum of exports and imports of goods and services 
measured as a share of gross domestic product 
WB 
S&P sovereign ratings S&P Numerical variable assigning 1 to BB, 2 to BB+ and so 
on through 13 to AAA 
 
Reuters 
ESG ESGindex Our variable of interest (ESGGI, ENVI, SODI, GOVI)  
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Table A.2.2: Descriptive statistics 
 
 
Variables 
 
N Mean St. Dev Min Max 
Spread (10YR) 380 0.204 2.06 –4.30 21.59 
      
ESGGI  380 73.63 7.18 56.28 89.23 
      
ΔGDP/GDP 380 1.98 2.54 –9.13 10.83 
      
ΔP/P 380 1.83 1.26 –2.53 6.95 
      
Debt/GDP 380 68.79 40.00 9.675 242.11 
      
PB/GDP 380 0.40 4.22 –29.81 15.88 
      
CA/GDP 380 0.95 5.62 –15.18 16.23 
      
(X+M)/GDP 380 77.25 35.59 18.34 209.65 
      
Reserves/import 380 0.26 0.86 0.04 1.67 
      
S&P 380 12.67 2.33 1 14 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table A.2.3: Pearson correlation matrix of independent variables: sovereign bond spreads 
 
 1 
 
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
1. Y (10YR) 
 
1          
2. ESGGI 
 
0.02 1         
3. ΔGDP/GDP 
 
–0.20*** –0.03 1        
4. ΔP/P 
 
–0.05 0.13*** 0.20*** 1       
5. Debt/GDP 
 
0.06 0.06 –0.33*** –0.17*** 1      
6. PB/GDP 
 
–0.09 –0.25*** –0.05 0.34*** –0.02 1     
7. CA/GDP 
 
–0.32** –0.20*** 0.44*** 0.15*** –0.32*** 0.30*** 1    
8. (X+M)/GDP 
 
–0.16 0.43*** –0.15*** 0.07 0.29*** –0.02 –0.17*** 1   
9. Reserves/import 
 
–0.11** 0.19 0.11** –0.09 –0.41*** 0.08 0.13** –0.32*** 1  
10. S&P 
 
–0.28*** 0.46*** 0.02 0.33*** –0.01 –0.36*** –0.07 0.25*** 
 
–0.04 1 
* significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1% 
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Figure 1. Heterogeneity across countries and over time 
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